eXp's Business Model Advantage

 
 

eXp has an exponentially more efficient cost structure than any of its brokerage peers.

Why it matters: In the highly uncertain market of 2022, with transaction volumes falling and brokerages responding by cutting costs, financial efficiency is more important than ever.

  • During my previous research on Compass' Cash Burn Problem and the Coming Brokerage Slowdown, I stumbled across a fascinating metric: operating expenses per transaction.

  • This metric measures the amount of company overhead -- support staff, office expense, technology, etc -- per closed transaction.

While its publicly-listed peers are all in the same ballpark, eXp has a remarkable advantage when it comes to operating expenses -- 10x more efficient than its peers.

  • And with over 110,000 transactions in Q1 2022, eXp is leveraging this advantage at scale.

 
 

The bottom line: The real estate industry is entering a period of heightened uncertainty with rising interest rates and falling transaction volumes, leading to a shrinking commission pool.

  • With a limited ability to affect revenue, brokerages will be forced to cut costs -- and in this environment, brokerages like eXp have a distinct advantage.

Brokerage Slowdown Begins

 
 

All real estate brokerages experience a seasonal decline in revenue during the first three months of the year -- but the amount varies between brokerage.

Why it matters: The degree of revenue decline highlights which companies are under- and over-performing "the market" -- a possible leading indicator of who may be in more or less trouble during a turbulent year ahead.

  • Quarterly revenue has declined the most at Redfin and Realogy, the least at eXp and Douglas Elliman, and Compass sits right in the middle.

  • Consequently, Compass and Realogy are in the midst of a steep, seasonal revenue drop while eXp slowly makes it way closer to the top.

 
 

The market is slowing and real estate agents are doing fewer transactions.

  • For example, the number of transactions per agent at Compass is at record lows, lower than Q1 last year and on par with the early days of the pandemic.

 
 

The bottom line: The market is softening. Less transactions mean less brokerage revenue.

The Opendoor MLS

 
 

Tucked away in Opendoor's recent earnings call was an enlightening statement by its CEO, Eric Wu, which sheds light on its exclusive supply strategy.

Why it matters: Exclusive content is a strategy being driven by VC-funded real estate tech disruptors, with important implications for consumers and a spotty track record of success.

  • A possible endgame for Opendoor is to match exclusive supply with demand directly -- off the MLS -- through an Opendoor ecosystem.

 
 

The benefits to Opendoor are clear: avoiding agent commissions, controlling the consumer experience start to finish, and streamlining the sales process.

Opendoor is not alone in wanting to build a supply of exclusive inventory to draw consumers to its private platform.

 
 

Compass also uses exclusive content to drive consumers directly to its platform, a clear endgame for the business.

  • Compass encourages sellers to list exclusively and privately on its platform.

  • Nearly a quarter of Compass' current listings are exclusive; a homebuyer has to call a Compass agent for access.

 
 

Yes, but: This isn't new.

The rise of exclusive content in real estate risks fragmenting the search and discovery process -- with considerable implications for consumers.

  • Buyers lose easy access to a complete view of the market by being forced to visit multiple sites (or call an agent like it's 1995).

  • For sellers, it fragments and artificially reduces the number of possible buyers, which could lead to less demand and a lower price for a property.

The bottom line: There is incredible value to whoever controls the home search platform. In the U.S., that's Zillow, realtor.com, and hundreds of MLSs.

  • New platforms -- leveraging exclusive content -- are a significant threat to these incumbent platforms.

  • And so far, the benefit to consumers is questionable.


Go deeper: I've previously explored this topic in my Strategic Analysis of The Top Threat to Real Estate Portals. Spoiler alter: It's exclusive content.

This analysis looks at several case studies from around the world.

Compass' Cash Burn Problem

 
 

Compass' latest financial results reveal a company that burned $142 million in cash during the first three months of 2022, with $476 million left in the bank.

Why it matters: Manufactured profitability metrics aside, cash is the fuel that powers all businesses.

  • Compass has a track record of significant cash burn (over $400 million in the past 15 months), with high fixed operating costs and expensive acquisitions.

 
 

There's a widening gap between Compass' gross profit (revenues after commission expense) and its operating expenses.

 
 

Compass is burning more cash and operates more unprofitably than any of its publicly-listed peers.

  • Realogy, eXp, and Douglas Elliman all have gross profits higher than their operating expenses.

 
 

Compass' cost base is significantly higher than last year; operating expenses are up 50 percent from Q1 2021 (excluding stock-based compensation).

  • But revenue growth is soft; Compass is only projecting eight percent revenue growth in Q2.

  • This is only operating expenses, and doesn't include capital expenditures and acquisitions.

 
 

Compass' cash burn over the next 12 months is highly dependent on the overall real estate market.

  • There's not a lot of margin of error; a challenging 2022 market will depress revenue and increase cash burn.

  • Specific projections aside, there is an undeniable downward trend in Compass' available cash balance, which is becoming more difficult to ignore.

 
 

What to watch: Compass is not in immediate peril, but it is approaching a critical juncture where it will either need to raise more money or reduce expenses.

  • The Compass business model relies on massive amounts of investment capital to subsidize massive financial losses.

  • It's not clear that the business can achieve breakeven on its current trajectory; its cash burn is unsustainable.

  • Compass may be forced to enact significant layoffs to recalibrate its burn rate.

Cash is king: After years of big spending, access to seemingly unlimited amounts of capital, and sustained unprofitability, the time has come for Compass to demonstrate a durable, self-sustaining business model.


A note on projections: This analysis uses the midpoint of Compass' guidance for Q2 revenue ($2.1 billion), and seasonal estimates for Q3 and Q4.

  • Gross margin is assumed to be 18 percent (Q1 2022 actual).

  • Operating expenses remain flat at Q1 2022 levels.

  • Roughly $50 million of capital expenditure and acquisition costs for the year (much lower than historical amounts; there was $190 million in 2021).

 
 

Opendoor 2022: Can't Stop, Won't Stop

 
 

2021 was a record year for Opendoor, and 2022 may be even bigger. To date, Opendoor has exponentially increased its advertising spend and homes purchased.

Why it matters: The latest data reveals a company doubling down on growth, despite rising market uncertainty and the risks illustrated by Zillow's 2021 implosion.

Opendoor's growth, as measured by the number of homes purchased, has materially accelerated.

  • Opendoor's monthly purchase volume is running significantly ahead of last year; March was big and April looks even bigger.

  • The company purchased 2.5x as many homes in Q1 2022 compared to the same time last year.

 
 

Opendoor's advertising spend is driving the growth in transaction volumes.

  • The company doubled its advertising spend in Q1 2022 compared to last year.

  • If that spend were annualized, Opendoor would be on track to invest a record $200 million on advertising in 2022.

 
 

The increasing advertising spend is causing Opendoor's customer acquisition costs to rise compared to 2021 (as calculated by total advertising spend divided by houses acquired).

  • But customer acquisition costs are lower than Q1 2021, showing improving economies of scale.

 
 

The bottom line: 2021 was a record year for Opendoor -- and the evidence suggests 2022 may be even bigger.

  • As a public company, Opendoor needs to demonstrate growth regardless of market conditions.

  • Despite recent profitability driven by record home price appreciation, Opendoor's model only works at scale -- a scale larger than 2021.

  • Opendoor remains committed to making its model work, and in a sense, is just getting started -- by operating at a scale where things get interesting.

Zillow Flex Grows In a Cooling Market

 
 

Zillow and realtor.com's Q1 results shine a light on two key factors: overall revenue growth is slowing in a cooling market, and Zillow's next gen lead gen business, Zillow Flex, is building momentum.

Why it matters: Zillow is going all in on next gen lead gen; it's an important evolution of the real estate portal business model, and perhaps the singularly most critical component of Zillow's future growth (Zillow 3.0: Back to Basics).

  • Revenue growth in Zillow's Premier Agent business, which includes Flex, has slowed, and is projected to remain relatively flat in the months ahead.

 
 

Zillow's plan is to double premier agent revenue by 2025.

  • It's far too early to pass judgement, but the results highlight future challenges -- and that Zillow will need to do something new to re-accelerate its business.

Comparatively, realtor.com's revenues are also flat, and its next gen lead gen business accounts for a similar amount of revenue as at Zillow (28 vs 25 percent).

 
 

But growth rates are radically different. Zillow's Flex revenues increased 200 percent from the same period last year, compared to an 18 percent increase at realtor.com.

  • Meanwhile, revenue in Zillow's traditional lead gen business dropped (!) 10 percent during the same time, compared to growth of 3 percent at realtor.com.

 
 

The evidence supports the narrative that Zillow is going all in on next gen lead gen.

  • It's extremely unlikely that Zillow will hit its 2025 targets with traditional, market-based pricing; it's all about Flex.

Yes, but: Even though traffic and lead volumes are down at the portals (22 percent lower for realtor.com), overall lead gen revenues are up (7.5 percent at realtor.com and 9 percent at Zillow).

  • The portals always win: In a slowing market, agents are paying more money for fewer leads.

The bottom line: It won't happen overnight, but the future of Zillow appears very much tied to the future of Flex.

Zillow Goes All In on Next Gen Lead Gen

 
 

Zillow recently announced that it was moving exclusively to its success fee Flex model in two major markets, Denver and Raleigh.

Why It Matters: Zillow Flex is "Next Gen Lead Gen," featuring a 35 percent commission share and lead qualification by Zillow employees. It's the future of real estate portal lead gen -- and gets Zillow much closer to the transaction.

  • In the past, Zillow has operated Flex alongside its traditional pay per lead model; this changes that.

  • By going all in in two major markets, Zillow is signaling its intent to control more of the transaction in order to satisfy its goals of doubling its Premier Agent business by 2025.

 
 

Zillow's new strategy (Zillow 3.0: Back to Basics) has the company going back to its roots, doubling down on agent lead gen, and extracting more revenue from real estate commissions.

 
 

Winners and losers: Next gen lead gen works for the agent partners that decide to participate in the program; those agents and brokers receive millions of leads.

  • But those agents may become even more reliant on the portal as a critical business partner, giving the portal more market power.

  • Over the long term, agents not participating in these invite-only programs will receive fewer online leads, and may be at a significant competitive disadvantage in the race to acquire customers.

What to watch: How Zillow integrates mortgage (Zillow Home Loans) and ShowingTime into its renewed Flex program.

Next Gen Lead Gen is a major trend discussed in my Real Estate Portal Strategy Handbook. Check out a free preview of the report, or this article on the topic!

The Ever-Shifting Landscape of Mortgage Disruption

 
 

Recent growth and contraction in the mortgage, iBuyer, and Power Buyer space has resulted in a reshuffling of the largest businesses aiming to disrupt the industry.

Why it matters: Mortgage is an emerging battleground in real estate, and the number of Mortgage Loan Originators (MLOs) employed by a company is an important leading indicator of that company's firepower and strategic intent in the space. Of note:

  • Opendoor has surged to #3 after acquiring RedDoor.

  • Significant layoffs at Knock and Homie have pushed Homeward into the #1 spot of emerging Power Buyers (full disclosure: I'm an advisor to Homeward).

Zillow and Knock have shed MLOs during a series of recent layoffs.

  • Zillow's MLO headcount is down 17 percent and Knock is down a massive 50 percent from December.

 
 

Better Mortgage and its employees have had a tough five months. So far, the business has lost about half -- around 600 -- of its MLOs through a series of layoffs.

 
 

Comparatively, Zillow still has significant firepower at its disposal; all eyes are on what's next for Zillow Home Loans in a post-Zillow Offers world.

 
 

Redfin and Prosperity Home Mortgage (a subsidiary of mega-broker HomeServices of America) dwarf Zillow and the others in the space, highlighting the latent power of incumbency.

  • Redfin (through Bay Equity), Prosperity, and Zillow operate more traditional mortgage businesses, while the others offer more disruptive services.

  • It's also important to differentiate between purchase and refinance business; many of the Power Buyers and iBuyers are focused on purchase.

 
 

The bottom line: Real estate tech disruptors are investing billions to build integrated brokerage and mortgage experiences.

  • Tracking MLOs over time reveals who is marshaling resources for future growth, who is making strategic retreats, and who has the most potential to effect change in the future.

Opendoor Set to Cash In from Record Home Price Appreciation

 
 

Home price appreciation is through the roof again, and Opendoor's buy-to-list premium (the difference between the purchase price and current listing price of a home) is at record highs.

Why it matters: Opendoor is going to make a lot of money in the first half of 2022.

Dig deeper: Opendoor's houses are currently listed for a median of 17 percent -- or $60k -- higher than what they were purchased for, on average, 72 days earlier.

  • This is based on 1,700 listings as of March 15, 2022 (excluding Texas), and according to YipitData's historical analysis through February, is an all-time high.

  • The distribution across listings shows a significant improvement from the end of 2021 -- and is pushing so high I had to adjust the chart's x-axis.

 
 

Buy-to-list is a good leading indicator of iBuyer profitability, and is usually a few percentage points higher than the eventual sales price.

  • Buy-to-list in one quarter generally affects the following quarter: Opendoor's low buy-to-list in Q3 2021 resulted in a low buy-to-sale premium and contribution margin in Q4 2021 (3.3 percent).

 
 

Opendoor is going to have a blockbuster Q2 2022 -- contribution margin is on track to exceed 2021's highs of 10 percent.

 
 

Yes, but: If Opendoor is the winner here, who is the loser?

  • Opendoor is no different than any other home seller in the market. If the home seller is the winner, the loser must then be home buyers -- scant inventory and rocketing home prices are making homes less affordable.

  • Opendoor is simply riding the market wave, and riding it really well (remember Zillow Offers?).

What's next: What goes up must come down; home price appreciation will slow, and Opendoor will once again need to deftly read the market and adjust its purchasing activity.

  • These extreme market risks are a big reason Zillow exited iBuying.

The bottom line: Opendoor (and Offerpad) are going to benefit tremendously from rising home price appreciation in the first half of 2022.

  • It's worth noting that this key financial driver isn't within Opendoor's control. Wildly rising home price appreciation isn't a business strategy, it's the market.

Big Tech Coming After Agent Commissions in a Big Way

The biggest real estate tech companies — Zillow, Compass, and Opendoor — have set their sights on agent commissions as a source of revenue and profit growth.

Why it matters: Agents remain the backbone of the industry, generating around $100 billion in commissions annually.

  • That commission pool is a rich target for big tech companies to tap into.

Zillow's new strategy (Zillow 3.0: Back to Basics) is centered on extracting an additional $1.5 billion from agents by 2025, for a total of $2.9 billion annually.

 
 

Compass wants to pay agents less. In its own words, Compass has a demonstrated track record of "improving economics with agents" of one percent per year.

  • Compass provides multiple slides that highlight its plans and ability to reduce commission splits paid to its agents over time.

 
 

In other words, if you're a Compass agent, the company's plan for profitability hinges on reducing your commission split over time. Sorry!

 
 

Opendoor continues to use its scale to push buyer agent commissions -- one of its biggest expenses -- lower.

  • In Atlanta, Opendoor has experimented with buyer agent commissions ranging from 1.5 to 3 percent, having finally settled on 2.25 percent.

  • Interestingly (and I don't think I can take credit for this), Opendoor dropped its lowest 1.5 percent buyer agent commission ten days after I published about the iBuyer War on Real Estate Commissions.

 
 

Some perspective:

  • Opendoor sold 20,000 houses in 2021. A 0.75 percent savings in buyer agent commissions is about $53 million annually.

  • Compass's medium term goal of a 2.5 percent commission split improvement on its 2021 revenues is $160 million annually.

  • Zillow wants to generate an additional $250–$300 million from agents per year.

Yes, but: These companies aren't simply raising prices; they're offering increased value to agents.

  • Opendoor promises partner agents increased deal flow and less time spent on each transaction.

  • Compass promises its agents increased deal flow and efficiency from its brand and tech platform.

  • Zillow provides agents with exclusive access to pre-qualified buyer leads.

The bottom line: Big Tech has big plans to extract hundreds of millions of dollars from real estate agents in the coming years.

  • Amidst a landscape of new models, disruptors, tech innovation and "super apps," there remains one consistent way to make money in real estate: commissions.

Can Opendoor Scale?

 
 

Opendoor, the original iBuyer and undisputed category leader, is laser-focused on scaling nationally and proving that it has a winning model.

Why it matters: Opendoor needs to demonstrate to investors that it has a credible path to profitability, and that as it grows it isn't just losing money faster. It needs economies of scale.

Opendoor reports a variety of financial metrics:

  • Net Loss is the total GAAP loss for the business.

  • Adjusted Net Loss backs out stock-based compensation expense ($536 million in 2021).

  • Adjusted EBITDA additionally backs out interest expense related to the purchase of homes ($140 million in 2021).

Now is not the time to debate the validity of each metric; let's consider all three. And to best illustrate economies of scale, let's divide each by the total number of homes sold in a period of time.

 
 

Improvement over time is clear. The key years are 2019 and 2021, when Opendoor sold a similar amount of homes: 19,000 in 2019 and 21,000 in 2021.

  • Opendoor's key metrics improved significantly between 2019 and 2021, with Adjusted EBITDA positive for the first time ever.

  • The exception is Net Loss, which bloated from $536 million of stock-based compensation expense related to its IPO.

 
 

Yes, but: Opendoor benefited from record-setting home price appreciation in 2021, resulting in unusually high gross profits and contribution margin.

  • Let's consider an alternate reality, where contribution margin in 2021 was a slightly more modest five percent (instead of 6.5 percent).

 
 

The result is still an improvement from 2019, an important sign of Opendoor's ability to lose less money per home as it scales.

  • But it's still losing money. While economies of scale are improving, the business remains unprofitable.

The bottom line: The evidence suggests that Opendoor can scale, both operationally through a challenging market, and economically as it realizes efficiency gains.

  • If durable profitability is the goal, reaching it depends on further economies of scale, attaching adjacent services, and a favorable macro environment -- all of which are uncertain and only some within Opendoor's control.


Coming Soon: The 2022 iBuyer Report. I'm putting together a new, ~200 slide, evidence-based look at the evolving world of instant home buyers. Pre-order today and save 10%.

Growth Machines: Compass, eXp, and the Future of Brokerage

 
 

The major, publicly-listed brokerages all posted impressive revenue, transaction, and agent count growth in 2021.

Why it matters: In a notoriously slow-moving industry, these are eye-catching gains. Revenue at Compass beat out Realogy's owned brokerage group for the first time.

  • eXp Realty doubled its U.S. revenue in 2021. For a business already operating at scale, this is a very impressive feat.

By the numbers: eXp Realty rocketed past industry incumbent Realogy in an accelerating growth curve, topping 400,000 transactions in 2021.

 
 

Agent counts are driving this growth. Despite promises of disintermediation, disruption and technological efficiency, the agent is still central to the transaction.

  • Compared to its peers, agent growth at eXp Realty has been jaw-dropping. eXp added more new agents in 2021 than Compass has in total.

 
 

The big picture: Amidst the hyperbole of disruption, the future of brokerage is still being shaped by real estate agents.

  • Brokerages are growing by recruiting more agents. The more agents a brokerage adds, the more that transactions grow.

 
 

Agent recruitment is a key competitive advantage for brokerages; Compass and eXp's growth has been propelled by generous financial incentives offered to agents.

  • Be smart: Perhaps consider Compass' technology platform through the lens of agent recruitment and retention, and its level of investment is understandable.


A note on eXp Realty: The numbers above are estimated for the U.S. market. eXp reports global figures, but also gives the percentage of revenue generated outside of the U.S. I've used that to estimate U.S. agent count, transaction volume, and revenue.

iBuyer Sales to Investors Soar

 
 

The major iBuyers sold approximately 20 percent of their inventory directly to investors in 2021, more than double the previous high in 2019.

Why it matters: These sales -- a growing part of the iBuyer business model -- mainly occur off market, meaning traditional home buyers never see them. And most of them are subsequently turned into rental properties.

By the numbers: This amounts to nearly 8,000 sales in 2021, a relatively small number, but one that has quadrupled since 2019.

  • Even though the number is small, it still matters -- especially to the thousands of families that missed out on the opportunity of homeownership.

 
 

All three of the major iBuyers sold significant portions of their inventory to institutional investors in 2021, with Opendoor leading the pack.

 
 

The big picture: Investors bought a record number of homes in 2021, and not just from iBuyers.

  • "Last year, investors bought nearly one in seven homes sold in America’s top metropolitan areas, the most in at least two decades," according to a Washington Post analysis.

  • "Those purchases come at a time when would-be buyers across the country are seeing wildly escalating prices, raising the question of what impact investors are having on prices for everyone else."

Fast forward: Opendoor's IPO documents set a goal of buying and selling upwards of 140,000 houses a year. Selling 20 percent to investors amounts to nearly 30,000 houses each year.

  • Taking inventory off the market, turning them into rentals, and reducing home ownership opportunities aren't part of the iBuyer narrative, but that's what's happening.

  • Selling to investors may be a sound business decision, but there are real world implications that directly affect thousands of American families.

Zillow 3.0: Back to Basics

 
 

Zillow's new strategy has the company going back to its roots, doubling down on agent lead gen, and extracting more revenue from real estate commissions.

Go deeper: The biggest growth driver is Zillow's premier agent business, which it plans to double by 2025. That's an additional $1.5 billion paid by real estate agents to Zillow.

  • These are aggressive targets and a step-change from past growth rates, which reflect the audaciousness of the strategy -- and a clear signal of intent.

 
 

By the numbers: Zillow's core business is stronger, and more profitable, than ever, giving the company a rock-solid foundation and plenty of cash for future growth.

  • Earnings in Zillow's IMT business, which includes premier agent, more than tripled over the past three years. It's the profitable engine room of Zillow 3.0.

 
 

Premier Agent saw an acceleration in revenue growth driven by unprecedented demand during the pandemic.

  • But quarterly revenue growth just dropped for the first time in 18 months. The pandemic bump won't continue indefinitely.

 
 

Zillow Home Loans, its mortgage play, is another key component of Zillow 3.0.

  • Like Premier Agent, revenue surged during the pandemic, but has slowed down significantly in the most recent quarter.

 
 

The pressing issue is that Zillow Home Loans is consistently unprofitable (net loss of $50 million in FY21).

  • Zillow is managing to lose a lot of money in a business that others can operate quite profitably.

  • The best case is that Zillow is smartly investing for the future. The worst case is that Zillow Home Loans is another Zillow Offers, beset by executional issues and overextension.

 
 

The bottom line: Zillow's 3.0 plan is centered around creating more transactions for premier agents and selling consumers adjacent services (mortgage and title).

  • Creating more transactions comes down to connecting consumers and agents in such a way that Zillow earns a commission.

  • That's a huge inflow of new business for premier agents, and it comes at the expense of non-premier agents.

Momentum Builds in Mortgage Disruption

 
 

Significant changes continue in the mortgage space as portals, iBuyers, Power Buyers, and brokers invest in building end-to-end real estate ecosystems.

Why it matters: Real estate tech disruptors are investing billions to build integrated brokerage and mortgage experiences. These companies employ licensed brokers -- Mortgage Loan Originators (MLOs) -- that occupy a critical position in securing or refinancing a mortgage.

  • The number and growth of MLOs is an important leading indicator of a company's firepower and strategic intent.

Big picture: Of the venture-backed disruptor pack, the companies with the most MLOs are those attempting to develop a complete ecosystem play anchored around mortgage: Power Buyers.

  • Homeward, Knock, and Flyhomes are good examples, while Orchard lags due to a slower-growth employee agent business model.

 
 

Notable growth in MLOs occurred at Opendoor and Flyhomes, sending a strong signal of intent.

  • In November 2021, Opendoor acquired RedDoor, a digital-first mortgage brokerage, with 10 MLOs.

  • In Q4 2021, Flyhomes accelerated its hiring of MLOs to meet current and expected demand.

 
 

Comparatively, Zillow has more firepower but has been shedding MLOs since May 2021, with a significant drop in January.

  • Knock, a Power Buyer, also saw a significant decline in MLOs during January.

 
 

Redfin made a huge move in January, acquiring Bay Equity Home Loans for $135 million, adding 485 MLOs to its roster.

  • This positions Redfin well ahead of Zillow in terms of underwriting capacity -- and is a strong signal of future intent in the space.

 
 

Yes, but: All of these companies pale in comparison to the behemoths of the mortgage industry.

  • Rocket Mortgage (12k MLOs) and Better Mortgage (1.5k MLOs) have both announced plans of their own to expand into the brokerage space.

The bottom line: Mortgage lies directly on the path of brokers, portals, and disruptors attempting to build an end-to-end real estate ecosystem.

  • Opendoor is clearly ramping up its mortgage resources and ambitions, while Redfin has made a big investment in the space.

  • Tracking the number of MLOs over time reveals how serious these companies are and their potential to grab market share.

iBuyer Market Share Soars in 2021

 
 

2021 was a transformative and record-breaking year for iBuyers. More houses were bought and sold by iBuyers than ever before.

Why it matters: iBuyers are one of the leading disruptive models in real estate. Their ability to grow, in all types of markets, is an important signal as to what degree the traditional real estate transaction can be disrupted.

  • But while 2021 saw record-high iBuyer transactions, it also saw the implosion of Zillow Offers after the business grew too quickly.

Big picture: iBuyer national market share of home purchases hit an all-time high of 1.3 percent -- around 70,000 houses -- in 2021.

 
 

iBuyer purchases remained robust as 2021 came to a close.

  • Even though Zillow stopped new purchases, it was on the hook to complete purchases that were already under contract.

  • Seasonality kicked in for Opendoor as it smartly slowed purchases after a massive acquisition spree in Q3.

 

Note: Q4 numbers are preliminary and subject to change.

 

iBuyer sales set new records in Q4, with more houses sold than ever before.

  • Opendoor consistently sold more houses each month, demonstrating an expanding operational capacity to repair and sell houses at scale.

  • This is a critical metric to watch. Buying houses is the (comparatively) easy part; selling at scale is difficult.

 

Note: Q4 numbers are preliminary and subject to change.

 

What's next: 2022 is all about profitability. Opendoor and Offerpad need to demonstrate that they can achieve consistently positive unit economics at scale.

  • With Zillow out of the picture, there will be less competitive pressure on fees and acquisition prices.

  • But Opendoor faces increasing competition from big incumbents, Power Buyers, and smaller brokerages, which have all launched similar products.

The bottom line: 2021 was a massive year for iBuyers. In particular, Opendoor is approaching the scale it promised during its IPO. If its economics fall into line, the company is poised to be a significant force in real estate.

Opendoor vs. Zillow: A Tale of Two Pricing Models

A catastrophic pricing failure sunk Zillow's iBuyer business. Clearly, home price appreciation is a key factor of the housing market in 2021 and beyond. And being able to accurately predict house prices -- not only today, but into the future -- is a non-negotiable prerequisite for iBuyers.

The best leading indicator of effective and accurate pricing is the buy-to-list premium; the difference between the purchase price and current listing price of a home. Unlike Opendoor, Zillow overpaid for the homes it acquired and is selling them for a loss; a negative buy-to-list premium, and a big problem.

 
 

Opendoor's median buy-to-list premium is rising once again, a sign of a healthy pricing and resale operation that is successfully reading the market.

While Opendoor's median buy-to-list premium is higher than Zillow's, the magic is in the distribution curve. Opendoor has a wide distribution of premiums that skews higher, leading to higher gross profits.

 
 

The finesse of Opendoor's pricing curve has been refined and improved over the past month. Not only has its median buy-to-list premium increased, but the percentage of listings with higher premiums has increased; the curve has shifted to the right.

 
 

A Matter of Timing

The buy-to-list premium is a leading indicator and a predictor of what is to come. The price a home sells for (buy-to-sale) is typically, but not always, a few percentage points lower than the listing price.

Even though Opendoor's buy-to-list premium is rising in Q4, its home price appreciation will be quite low for the quarter due to the intense pricing pressure of the previous quarter.

Strategic Implications

A comparison of Zillow Offers and Opendoor highlights the critical importance of pricing in iBuying. There's an understated elegance in the detail; it's not just buying low and selling high. A successful pricing operation -- not just an algorithm, but people! -- needs to work at scale, needs to improve over time, and needs to be more nuanced than a brute-force bell curve.

As the Zillow Offers collapse has demonstrated, pricing is a true potential competitive advantage for iBuyers. Getting it right is a prerequisite for success, while getting it wrong can lead to catastrophic failures.

Next Gen Lead Gen

Next generation lead generation is the most significant business model shift for real estate portals since their birth. It is the evolution towards delivering fully qualified leads with a commission share model, and it accounts for an increasing percentage of portal lead gen revenues -- while bringing them closer to the transaction.

An Emerging Global Trend

The evolution is occurring globally and targets both buyer and seller leads. The key themes include lead qualification and a commission share model (aka success fee).

Leading real estate portals around the world have made significant investments into next gen lead gen, including several large acquisitions.

 
 

The U.S. portals focus on monetizing buyer leads, while international portals like ImmoScout24 and MeilleursAgents focus on seller leads. The most effective way to reach prospective sellers is with property valuations: “What is my home worth?”

A key element of this model is that leads are qualified before being handed off to a partner agent. Leads are called directly by the portal, typically within minutes of submitting a form.

 
 

The second key element of next gen lead gen is the use of a commission share, or success fee, model. If a lead transacts, the agent pays a percentage of their commission back to the portal.

 
 

The commission share varies by market, but is generally around a third of an agent's commission. And this source of revenue accounts for an increasing share of portal revenue; realtor.com generates about a third of its lead gen revenue from the commission share model, as does ImmoScout24.

 
 

A Win for Consumers, Portals, and (some) Agents

Next gen lead gen lays the groundwork for a triple win: the promise of a better consumer experience, less wasted time for agents, and a more valuable product for portals.

The potential downside of next gen lead gen programs lie in their exclusive nature. It's not for everyone; agent networks consist of a small and exclusive group of the total agent pool.

 
 

Over the long term, the agents not participating in these programs will receive fewer online leads, and may be at a significant competitive disadvantage in the race to acquire customers. Next gen lead gen is revolutionizing the portal lead gen business model, but it only works for the agents that jump on board.

Next Gen Lead Gen is a major trend discussed in my Real Estate Portal Strategy Handbook.

iBuyer Market Share Rockets to New High

Before Zillow's meltdown, national iBuyer market share surged to another all-time high, blowing past all previous records by a wide margin. In Q3 2021, iBuyers accounted for 1.6 percent of all homes purchased in the U.S. That's around 28,000 homes, nearly double the 15,000 homes purchased by iBuyers in Q2.

 
 

The situation will certainly change with Zillow exiting the market and seasonality kicking in during Q4 2021. But for the time being, iBuyers have never been bigger, and Opendoor is now left as the undisputed category leader.

Also noteworthy: iBuyer Market share in Phoenix, the largest iBuyer market, peaked to a new high of 10.8 percent. This is the first time iBuyers have exceeded 10 percent market share in a major market -- a significant, if temporary, achievement.

 
 

Opendoor's Earnings: Painfully Normal

Both Opendoor and Zillow scaled their iBuying operations tremendously in Q3, but while Zillow's business spectacularly imploded, Opendoor demonstrated critical economies of scale. As it grows, its net loss per home is improving.

 
 

These charts show net profit/loss based on simple math: total net profit/loss for the business divided by the number of houses sold (excluding stock-based compensation expense). The result is a benchmark of business model efficiency.

While Opendoor and Offerpad improved their net profit/loss in 2021 (benefiting from record home price appreciation), Zillow's just got worse (and that's excluding the $304M inventory writedown) -- another reason Zillow Offers just wasn't working out.

 
 

As it scales, Opendoor's revenue (and gross profits) are increasing faster than fixed and variable costs. That's a positive sign, and something critically important to Opendoor's growth and profitability narrative.