The Zillow Revenue Growth Fallacy
/Conventional wisdom is that revenue growth is good, and is an important benchmark to measure a company’s success. But total revenue and revenue growth are misleading metrics for iBuying; they’re simply a proxy for how much capital the company has available to purchase houses.
To increase revenue, Uber needs people to request rides, Airbnb needs travelers to book stays, and Netflix needs consumers to subscribe. iBuyers simply need to buy more houses, and the more houses they buy, the more houses they sell.
It takes no great skill to enter a market with a lot of money and start buying houses. But it takes a great deal of skill to resell those houses and generate a profit.
Zillow is currently losing money on each house it buys and resells. Overall losses in its Homes segment (Zillow Offers) are mounting: a $100 million net loss in Q4 2019, and a $312 million net loss in 2019.
Looking at the unit economics of each home, which includes the purchase price, sale price, agent commissions, interest expense, holding and renovation costs, Zillow lost over $6,000 per home it purchased and resold. That number has fluctuated over the year, but is rising.
(What's driving the loss? Since Q1, the average holding cost per home is up $1,000 and the average interest expense per home is up $1,000 -- both signs that it's taking longer to resell homes.)
After all business expenses are factored in: sales and marketing, technology development, employee salaries, office space -- everything -- Zillow is losing $56,000 for each home it purchases and resells.
Zillow’s entry into the iBuyer market is still in the early stages. The fact that the business is unprofitable should come as no surprise. The hope -- and it is really just hope at this stage -- is that profitability will come with scale and adjacent revenue streams like title insurance and mortgage.
What’s unclear is not Zillow’s strategy nor rationale for being an iBuyer. Rather, it is why Wall Street, or any other investor or media outlet, is rewarding Zillow for “beating” its revenue guidance. Not only is Zillow able to generate revenue at will by buying more houses, it loses more money with each house it buys. In effect, Zillow is being rewarded for losing more money than originally planned.
The Real Story: Premier Agent Growth
What Zillow should be rewarded for is bringing its Premier Agent Program back to growth. After a precipitous decline in 2018 and all growth grinding to a halt earlier this year, the program is back to growth mode -- albeit small.
Time will tell if Premier Agent growth will continue as Zillow continues to roll out its flex program, but the early signs are encouraging.
Choose Your Data Carefully
Zillow is investing heavily to grow a new business line, and its ability to sustain losses is reflective of how big it sees the opportunity. My hope -- and it is really just hope at this stage -- is that more sophisticated industry observers will stop putting so much emphasis on pure revenue growth as a metric for success.